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LEGISLATION AND PEDAGOGY IN CONTRACTS 101 
H. MILES FOY, III* 
Every teacher of contract law understands implicitly that no other first-year 
course is so worthy of devotion.  The turgid practicalities of property law, the 
murky waters of tort, the empty abstractions of civil procedure, the unruly 
politics of crime and punishment, all of these things recede from view within 
this happy field.  Confident students discover, in the law of contracts, a warm, 
sunlit upland, where lucid philosophy and sober common sense combine in 
equal measure to bring meaning and coherence to the world of ordinary affairs. 
Nor is that all.  Contract law is wonderfully well suited to the dominant 
mode of legal instruction, the case method.  The rules of contract law, which 
are reasonably clear in themselves, are deliciously uncertain in their 
application to particular cases.  Students must therefore study the cases to 
obtain a clear understanding of the matter at hand.  The inventor of the case 
method, Christopher Columbus Langdell, the patron saint of American legal 
pedagogy, was himself a professor of contract law.  No other calling would 
have fitted him so well.  His Selection of Cases on the Law of Contracts1 
started the ball rolling 130 years ago, and it has been rolling and gathering 
momentum ever since. 
Furthermore, the case method teaches our students an important lesson 
about the nature of contract law, or so we prefer to believe.  Contract law, or 
much of it, originates in the judicial department.  We are dealing here with a 
modern extension of an ancient common-law tradition, and we must therefore 
recognize the importance of the judicial process itself.  Wise students of 
contract law will scrutinize the opinions of appellate judges and master, or 
attempt to master, the traditional techniques of legal argument and analysis.  
These are the things that have determined the content of contract law over the 
years.  What better lesson could a budding lawyer learn? 
Finally, contract law appeals to the political instincts of most legal 
academicians.  Most of us approve of the modern liberal state, and we believe 
that the “institution of contract” plays an important role in its creation and 
preservation.  Individual liberty, the freedom of association, the right to pursue 
 
* Associate Dean and Professor of Law, Wake Forest University. 
 1. CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF 
CONTRACTS (1871). 
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happiness (not to mention efficiency) within the economic realm, all of these 
things depend in one way or another upon an effective system of private 
ordering.  Without such a system (without contract law!) things would fall 
apart.  Professors of constitutional law are entitled to the respect that they so 
often receive, but professors of contract law know where the real constitutional 
battle is won or lost. 
Thus, in this splendid little course, several large themes are presented.  The 
idea that law is practical reason, the idea that law emerges from judicial action, 
the idea that private ordering is important to civil society, the idea that law 
should generally support private ordering, all of these propositions are 
embedded in the traditional fabric.  I suspect that Christopher Columbus 
Langdell hammered away on each of these themes as he faced his students at 
Harvard long ago, and I suspect that most modern teachers of contract law take 
a similar approach.  After perusing the many modern casebooks and hornbooks 
on the law of contracts, I conclude that the grand tradition is alive and well. 
Yet the grand tradition is far from perfect, and as each year passes, I 
become increasingly convinced that a major revision is in order.  One part of 
the problem is that the established forms do not deal adequately with 
legislation, the most important legal phenomenon of the modern era.  
Legislation so surrounds and pervades the law of contracts that the old themes 
are somewhat askew.  One can think of contract law as the fruit of judicial 
action and the lawyer’s art, but the practical politics of the legislative chamber 
account for so much of the modern law of contracts that the old faith is hard to 
hold.  One can think of contract law as a system of private ordering, but the 
modern liberal state hedges private commitment with numerous public 
commands; and if our students leave our classrooms dreaming only of 
peppercorns, Benjamin Cardozo, and ships named the “Peerless,” they will be 
poorly equipped to deal with the world as it is.  To be sure, conscientious 
teachers of contract law can still extract Langdellian nuggets from the modern 
mix.  (The grand tradition is alive and well, as I have said.)  But the time has 
come for teachers and scholars alike to provide a better, clearer, more 
comprehensive and more rigorous account of the role of legislation in the law 
of contracts, and we must put this subject in the foreground of the first-year 
course.  I will enlarge upon this idea in the paragraphs below, and I will make 
some modest proposals for reform. 
I 
SOME PEDAGOGICAL PROBLEMS 
It is not easy to count the ways in which legislation influences the modern 
law of contracts.  The effect is sometimes open and brutal, as in the case of the 
Uniform Commercial Code, a comprehensive legislative structure that restates 
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and modifies a vast body of contract law according to a carefully considered, 
expertly drafted plan.  More often, the relevant legislation is limited in scope.  
Many statutes and administrative rules address narrow questions in the law of 
contracts, affirming or modifying single points of law, as in the case of the 
New York statute which declares that certain promises made in recognition of 
antecedent benefits are legally enforceable, despite the old common-law rule.2 
Occasionally legislation supplements the common law without attacking it 
directly, as in the case of the disclosure provisions of the Truth in Lending 
Act.3  Occasionally legislation produces effects that are difficult to assess, as in 
the case of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act,4 which flatly 
preempts state contract law insofar as it applies to certain “employee benefit 
plan[s],” 5 only to replace it with a legislatively undefined body of “federal 
common law” that resembles nothing so much as the law of trusts. 
Sometimes legislation does not purport to affect contract law but is held to 
do so nonetheless, as in the case of the criminal statutes that implicitly limit the 
common-law doctrine of employment-at-will.6  Sometimes legislation does 
purport to affect contract law but is held to be ineffective in one respect or 
another, as in the case of the Statute of Frauds, which mysteriously recedes in 
the face of the doctrine of promissory estoppel, leaving the courts free to 
enforce oral agreements that induce reasonable and substantial reliance.7  
Finally, there are many statutes and administrative rules that do not actually 
state, restate, revise, supplement, suspend, abrogate, or otherwise affect the 
substantive law of contracts, except to the extent that they regulate transactions 
that are contractual in nature, and thus they become, as a practical matter, so 
entwined with contract law that only a scholastic philosopher could sort the 
matter out.  For example, the Occupational Safety and Health Act8 and the 
regulations promulgated thereunder9 do not deal directly with substantive 
contract law, yet they establish duties which employers and employees cannot 
alter by negotiation or consent, and thus, as a practical matter, they 
dramatically restrict the power of contract law in the context of the 
employment relationship.  Law is a seamless web, as a famous man once said. 
If a dedicated scholar were to make a list of all the statutes and rules that 
affect the law of contracts directly or indirectly, she would have plenty of work 
to do.  I would not recommend the project.  The list would be too long, and it 
 
 2. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1105 (McKinney 1989). 
 3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-67f (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). 
 4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-461 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). 
 5. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994). 
 6. See, e.g., Sides v. Duke Univ., 328 S.E.2d 818 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985) (at-will employee 
may not be discharged for refusal to violate perjury statute). 
 7. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 139 (1981). 
 8. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). 
 9. Occupational Safety and Health Standards, 29 C.F.R. § 1910 (1999). 
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would grow with each new legislative session.  It would literally never end.  
For present purposes I am content to rely upon the general proposition that 
there is plenty of legislation in existence that affects the law of contracts in one 
way or another. 
If all of this legislation did not exist, or if it were less important in the 
grand scheme of things, our task as teachers of contract law would be much 
simpler than it is.  We could then proceed as Langdell envisioned.  We could 
treat the course as an investigation into the common law, and we could rely 
upon the case method to drive that point home.  And if, on the other hand, we 
lived under a civil-law system, and if all the law of contracts were legislatively 
prescribed, our lives would be much simpler still.  We could begin the course 
with the code itself, we could provide each student with a copy of the code, 
and we could ignore judicial opinions and the questions that arise at the 
intersection of legislation and common law (because there would be no 
common law and no authoritative judicial opinions to cite).  But under the 
present American system we must deal with a rich mix of common law and 
legislation.  Both of these bodies of law are important in themselves.  Neither 
is merely incidental to the larger story.  This situation is complex, and it 
creates various difficulties for students and teachers alike. 
A. The Common-law Bias 
A first-year course in contract law almost always begins with a discussion 
of some topic that is dominated by common-law principles.  I begin my own 
course with a discussion of the process of contract formation.  My students are 
perplexed by the concepts of “offer” and “acceptance,” and during the warm 
days of September they read judicial decisions that pour common-law content 
into these empty forms.  Yet the situation would be much the same if I began 
the course at some other point.  There are various avenues of approach.  I could 
start with a discussion of consideration (a common-law concept), or I could 
take up the subject of damages and the various interests that the common law 
of contracts allegedly protects.  Or I could begin with a potpourri of cases that 
afford a spacious overview of the entire course, and I could then return to the 
gritty details of contract formation, consideration, damages, or something else.  
But whatever approach I chose to take, my syllabus would almost certainly 
expose the students to a heavy dose of common law in the early going. 
There are sound historical and pedagogical reasons for this.  It makes sense 
to begin a first-year course with a discussion of fundamentals, and the 
fundamentals of contract law were laid down many years ago as common law.  
The legislation that affects the law of contracts is mostly a latter-day 
development, and it rests upon a common-law foundation.  It rarely deals with 
fundamental questions; and even when it does, as in the case of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, it borrows shamelessly from the common law.  It would be 
difficult to understand this great body of legislation without first understanding 
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the common law of contracts, and thus, we rightly expose our students to the 
common law before proceeding to a higher level. 
The problem with this sensible sequence is that it subjects our students to 
an experience from which they never fully recover.  Luxuriating in the 
common law and its methods, they become convinced that there is only a loose 
connection between law and particular forms of words, that rational argument 
is the key to the legal enterprise, that judicial decisions are central to the 
development of law, and that one may praise or criticize judicial decisions 
according to the wisdom or folly of the policies they reflect.  In other words, 
our students quickly embrace the grand tradition, and having once embraced it, 
they never let it go.  Accordingly, when legislative decisions begin to crop up 
in the cases they are reading, they are poorly equipped to handle the freight.  
They resist the suggestion that there is a fundamental difference between a 
statutory formula and a common-law rule.  They usually neglect to read the 
relevant statutes even when they are requested to do so.  They tend to argue 
about statutory questions as if the legislature itself did not exist.  They assume 
that in statutory cases, as in any case, the legally important thing is the wisdom 
or folly of the policy or policies in question.  They accept in principle the idea 
that legislative action can somehow limit argument about what the law is, but 
they are reluctant to apply this principle to their own deliberations.  I cannot 
blame them.  We teach them to think as they do. 
My point is simple enough.  In the early stages of the traditional course in 
contract law we teach our students how to think about the common law of 
contracts—a valuable lesson, to be sure.  Yet there is little in the common-law-
way-of-thinking that prepares them to think critically and sensibly about 
legislation, and they must master legislation if they are to master contract law.  
In other words, using Langdellian methods, spinning our dialogues and 
critiquing our cases, we succeed wonderfully in introducing our students to one 
part of the law of contracts (the common-law part), but we do a poor job of 
introducing them to the other.  Indeed, we encourage them to develop a 
common-law bias that actually interferes with the education they must 
ultimately receive. 
B. Explaining Legal Events at the Intersection of Legislation and Common 
Law 
Even if we were to succeed completely in teaching our students about the 
legislative and common-law components of the law of contracts, we would still 
have one more job to do.  We would have to teach them about the hybrid legal 
events that occur at the intersection of legislation and common law—events 
that somehow reflect both phenomena at once.  The subject is perplexing.  The 
courts have never dealt with it adequately, and the traditional casebooks and 
hornbooks do not take up the slack.  Set forth below are seven not-so-easy 
pieces, taken straight from the first-year course, which illustrate the 
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complexities that arise in the law of contracts from the interaction between 
legislation and common law.  More illustrations can be supplied on request.  
The challenge is to find a way to discuss these phenomena intelligibly. 
1. Statutes and Covenants-not-to-Compete 
In the midst of a traditional discussion of the employer-employee 
relationship, or in the midst of a more general discussion of the so-called 
“public-policy” defense, the first-year student may well encounter a case or 
two involving covenants-not-to-compete.  The subject is important in itself, 
and it appeals to anyone who is interested in the interaction between legislation 
and common law.  The student will gather from the assigned materials that 
covenants-not-to-compete are sometimes enforceable and sometimes not.  
They are enforceable if they are reasonable with respect to the temporal and 
territorial restrictions they impose, if they protect some legitimate interest 
belonging to the employer, and if they are not deemed to be injurious to the 
public.  They are unenforceable if they do not pass these tests.10  If the student 
is very good, she will perceive that the limitations on the enforceability of 
covenants-not-to-compete reflect conflicting public policies: on the one hand, a 
policy that favors free competition, and, on the other hand, a policy that 
protects the employer’s interest in conducting business without fear of 
interference from disloyal employees (a policy that probably dates back to the 
days of indentured servitude and body arrest).  And if the student is very, very 
good, she will note that the first policy is embedded in legislation, e.g., the 
Sherman Act,11 whereas the second policy, in most jurisdictions, is a creature 
of the common law and the judicial inventiveness that gives rise to common 
law. 
Thus, the question of the enforceability of covenants-not-to-compete is 
complex.  It is not simply a common-law question, and it is not simply a 
legislative question.  The student begins with the proposition that promises 
supported by consideration are generally enforceable.  She then observes that 
the legislature has power to trump the common law.  She recognizes that the 
legislature has acted in this instance, boldly declaring that contracts “in 
restraint of trade” are “illegal.”12  Finally, she observes that despite the 
legislature’s action, covenants-not-to-compete are deemed to be enforceable if 
they pass certain judicially identified tests.  How does one explain this result?  
Is it simply a question of statutory interpretation?  If it is, why do the courts 
interpret these statutes as condemning some covenants-not-to-compete but not 
others?  What theory or theories support such an interpretation?  Is it possible 
to quarry from the language of these statutes, or from the demonstrable 
 
 10. See, e.g., Karlin v. Weinberg, 390 A.2d 1161 (N.J. 1978). 
 11. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994). 
 12. Id. § 1. 
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legislative intentions, anything that resembles the judicially identified tests?  
Are conscientious judges supposed to treat legislation this way?  Conscientious 
contracts teachers could spend a week or two on questions such as these, but of 
course I never do. 
2. Statutory Duties and the Pre-existing Duty Rule 
The “pre-existing duty rule” is a glittering jewel in the common law of 
contracts.  If Smith makes a promise to Jones, and if Jones makes a promise to 
Smith in return, the courts will hold that Smith’s promise does not provide a 
legally sufficient consideration for Jones’ promise if Smith already has a legal 
obligation to do what he is promising to do.  This rule may have originated in 
cases involving contract modification.  If Smith and Jones already have a 
contract between them, and if Jones makes a new promise to Smith based only 
on Smith’s old commitment, there is probably no good reason to enforce 
Jones’ new promise, because he is getting nothing new from Smith in return 
for it.  Essentially, he is promising to make a gift.  And even if Smith gratefully 
reconfirms his old commitment to Jones in exchange for Jones’ new promise, 
the legal situation remains the same.  A promise to perform a pre-existing 
contractual obligation does not provide a legally sufficient consideration for a 
new promise by the old obligee.13 
The interesting thing is that the courts sometimes invoke this rule in cases 
involving pre-existing statutory duties.  If Smith has a statutory duty to do one 
thing or another, if Smith makes a promise to Jones to perform that duty, and if 
Jones makes a promise in return, many courts will hold that Smith’s promise 
does not provide a legally sufficient consideration for Jones’ promise, because 
Smith is undertaking to do nothing more than what he is already bound to do.14  
Jones is not getting anything new from Smith, or so the argument goes. 
But this argument makes little sense.  Obviously, Jones is getting 
something new from Smith in this case.  (He is getting a promise from Smith, 
and Smith has made no promise to him before.  That is why this case is 
different from the contract-modification case.)  Why, then, do the courts hold 
that Smith’s promise does not provide sufficient consideration for Jones’ 
promise?  Perhaps the courts are assuming that the statute itself would make 
Smith liable to Jones if Smith fails to perform his statutory duty.  Indeed, if 
that is the case, Smith’s promise is truly superfluous because it adds nothing to 
the liability that the statute itself creates.  But many, probably most, public 
statutes create duties without creating contract-like liabilities in favor of 
persons such as Jones, and thus the no-consideration argument begs a crucial 
statutory question: what kind of liability does the statute in question impose?  
 
 13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 73 (1981). 
 14. Id. 
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If it does not impose a contract-like liability in favor of Jones, Smith’s promise 
to Jones is far from superfluous, and the no-consideration argument falls flat. 
And there may be other statutory concerns as well.  If Smith happens to be 
a public official, and if Jones is promising to pay Smith to perform his official 
duties, the statutory prohibition against extortion or bribery would condemn 
the deal in all likelihood.  Jones’ promise would then be unenforceable, not 
because it is flatly unsupported by consideration, but because it is illegal.  The 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts recognizes this point.15 
On the other hand, if we can put the statutory concerns to rest, why should 
the contract between Smith and Jones not be enforced?  Assume that Jones is a 
rich old geezer and that Smith is his bright-eyed, college-bound nephew.  
Assume further that Smith has a statutory duty to refrain from drinking alcohol 
until he reaches age twenty-one.  If Smith promises Jones that he will perform 
this statutory duty faithfully, and if Jones promises to pay him $5,000 if he 
succeeds, why should the courts let Jones welsh on the deal?  Nothing in the 
relevant legislation makes Smith liable to Jones for breach of this statutory 
duty.  Nothing in the law of bribery or extortion would bar this laudable and 
altogether beneficial arrangement.  If Smith promises his uncle that he will 
abstain, and if he succeeds in keeping his promise, why should the doctrine of 
consideration let his uncle off the hook?16  (A teacher of contract law could 
spend a good deal of time attempting to answer questions such as this, but, of 
course, I rarely do.) 
3. Legislation and Third-Party Enforcement of Government Contracts 
The question of the implicit effect of public legislation on private contract 
rights, which is squarely presented in cases involving statutory duties and the 
pre-existing duty rule, arises in many other contexts as well.  I am indebted to 
Professors Charles Knapp, Nathan Crystal and Harry Prince for bringing my 
attention to an interesting line of cases, noted in the fourth edition of their 
excellent casebook,17 which discuss the implicit effect of public legislation on 
the rights of third-party beneficiaries of government contracts.  Under the 
common law a person who is not a party to a contract has a right to sue for its 
enforcement if she is an “intended beneficiary” of the contract.18  But what 
makes her an “intended beneficiary”?  In cases involving governmental 
contracts, various courts have suggested that the answer may turn on the 
interpretation of the legislation that creates the contracting authority.  If the 
legislation itself contains evidence of a legislative intention to benefit a certain 
 
 15. Id. at cmt. b. 
 16. Cf. Hamer v. Sidway, 27 N.E. 256 (N.Y. 1891). 
 17. CHARLES L. KNAPP ET AL., PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (4th 
ed. 1999). 
 18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 (1979). 
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class of people, then such people may be the “intended beneficiaries” of 
contracts made pursuant to that legislation, and they may therefore be able to 
sue to enforce them.19 
What is interesting here is the interaction between the relevant legislation 
and the common law.  On the one hand, the legislation in these cases does not 
expressly create a private right of enforcement.  It has that effect because of the 
operation of a common-law principle that attributes legal significance to the 
legislature’s mere intention to benefit third parties.  On the other hand, the 
common law alone would not confer third-party standing in these cases.  The 
evidence of legislative support is crucial.  So what is going on here?  These 
cases appear to recognize a kind of synergy between legislation and common 
law which creates contract rights that neither the legislation itself nor the 
common law itself would recognize alone.  From what jurisprudential source 
does this synergy spring?  Would it be wiser in these cases for the courts to ask 
whether judicial recognition of third-party standing would be appropriate to 
effectuate the legislature’s policy (a legislatively oriented question)?  Or would 
it be wiser for them to focus, as the common law once did, on the status of the 
third party and the inherent justice of his claim? 
4. Statutory Liens and the Rights of Subcontractors 
If legislation can implicitly create contract rights that would not otherwise 
exist, it can also implicitly deny contract rights or quasi-contractual rights.  
Consider, for example, the plight of the conscientious subcontractor who 
performs faithfully and improves the owner’s property, only to discover that 
the prime contractor is broke and incapable of paying the bill.  Does the 
subcontractor have any claim against the ungrateful owner?  Some courts say 
yes.20  If the owner has not yet paid the prime contractor for the improvements 
the subcontractor has made, the subcontractor may have a claim against the 
owner for the value of the improvements.  The theory is unjust enrichment.  
The owner should have to pay for the benefit that the subcontractor conferred 
upon him.  Assume, however, that the legislature has considered the plight of 
such subcontractors and has enacted a statute that allows them to file 
mechanics liens against the property they have improved.  Assume further that 
the subcontractor neglects to file such a lien.  Does his failure to comply with 
the statute adversely affect his quasi-contract claim at common law?  Some 
courts say yes.21  Although the statute may not expressly declare that the 
 
 19. See, e.g., Zigas v. Superior Court, 174 Cal. Rptr. 806 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981), cert. denied, 
455 U.S. 943 (1982). 
 20. See, e.g., Commerce Partnership 8098 Ltd. Partnership v. Equity Contracting Co., 695 
So. 2d 383, 387 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997), citing Maloney v. Therm Alum Indus. Corp., 636 So. 
2d 767 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994). 
 21. See, e.g., Season Comfort Corp. v. Ben A. Borenstein Co., 655 N.E.2d 1065 (Ill. Ct. 
App. 1995). 
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mechanic’s lien is the subcontractor’s “exclusive remedy,” some courts hold 
that it is; therefore, if the subcontractor does not comply with the statutory 
procedure, he will be out of luck. 
Here the intersection of statutory law and common law produces 
unexpected results.  Why would a lien statute, which is presumably intended to 
benefit subcontractors in cases such as these, operate to defeat a claim that the 
common law would otherwise uphold?  Should we think of this as a question 
of statutory interpretation, or should we think of it as a matter that implicates 
judge-made policy—a policy that punishes otherwise worthy citizens who fail 
to follow the legislatively prescribed paths? 
5. Statutes of Limitation and the Revival of Old Debts 
The traditional teaching materials sometimes acknowledge hybrid issues 
such as the ones I am discussing here, but often they do not.  I would highlight 
such issues at every reasonable opportunity, and I am therefore especially 
pained by the failure of the traditional materials to recognize the hybrid nature 
of one of the oldest chestnuts in the law of contracts. 
The problem is usually presented in the following way.  Smith makes a 
contract with Jones.  Smith performs the contract in full, but Jones does not.  
Time passes.  The statute of limitations runs.  A remorseful Jones 
acknowledges his old contractual obligation and promises to perform it.  A 
grateful Smith accepts.  The question is whether Jones’ new promise is legally 
enforceable.  Traditionally, this is almost always presented as a question of 
“consideration.”  There seems to be no “consideration” in the usual sense for 
Jones’ new promise, and thus, to the uninitiated eye, the promise would appear 
to be unenforceable.  But the common-law courts, in defiance of every 
reasonable expectation, held that the antecedent legal obligation did provide 
consideration for the new promise, even though the old obligation lay in the 
past and was now time-barred.  In other words, the courts made an end run 
around the doctrine of consideration and allowed the new promise to revive the 
old debt.  That, at any rate, is the traditional account. 
Yet I would argue that something rather different was happening in these 
ancient cases.  To be sure, the old courts were making an end run around the 
doctrine of consideration, but they were making this end run to strike a blow 
against the statute of limitations.  They did not want the statute to bar 
collection of the old debt, and to prevent that from happening, they 
manipulated the common law to convert an otherwise unenforceable promise 
into a freshly minted contract—a contract against which the statute had not yet 
run.  The real question presented by these cases is not whether they can be 
reconciled with the doctrine of consideration but whether they can be 
reconciled with the legislative policy that limits the time within which contract 
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actions must be brought.  Was this manipulation of the common law consistent 
with the legislative command?22 
6. Statutes and the Enforcement of Contracts Affecting Marriage and the 
Family 
Hybrid issues such as the issue of the revival of time-barred debts are 
relatively unimportant in themselves, but many hybrid issues are of paramount 
importance.  I can think of no single set of issues in the first-year course that 
are more important than those that arise in cases involving marriage and the 
family, and many of these reflect an intriguing interplay between statutory 
policy and common law.  Of course, the “palimony” cases come to mind,23 as 
do the cases involving surrogate motherhood and the like.24  Marital affairs, 
domestic partnerships, reproductive arrangements, custody arrangements, 
agreements involving human genetic material and human embryos, all of these 
transactions are at least potentially subject to private ordering through the 
common law, yet all of them are also subject in one way or another to public 
choices reflected in public legislation, and in recent years the courts have been 
presented with difficult cases that require them to reconcile the one body of 
law with the other.  How is this to be done?  Which order, public or private, 
will prevail? 
Cases such as these present rich pedagogical opportunities.  The risk is that 
the discussion will dissolve into an interesting but unfocused inquiry into the 
pro’s and con’s of the contract in question.  (Is a “surrogate-motherhood” 
agreement a good thing or a bad thing?)  It is necessary to focus, instead, on 
the actual legal materials involved in the case.  These disputes usually involve 
statutes that are uncertain in their application to the facts presented.  The 
transaction is novel in one way or another, and the statutes simply do not fit.  
The courts must therefore determine the relevance or the irrelevance of the 
public choices that the statutes represent.  Are adoption statues legally relevant 
to a dispute involving a custody agreement between a “surrogate mother” and 
her sperm-donor?  (Some courts say yes.25)  Are equitable distribution statutes, 
which usually apply to married persons, relevant to a dispute between 
unmarried domestic partners who have lived together for many years and have 
now decided to split?  (Some courts say no.26)  Such questions require our 
 
 22. In some modern American jurisdictions, the legislature has cured the jurisprudential 
problem by enacting legislation that affirms the old common-law rule, subject to the requirement 
that the subsequent promise must be in writing.  See ERIC MILLS HOLMES, 3 CORBIN ON 
CONTRACTS § 9.14 (rev. ed. 1992); RICHARD A. LORD, 4 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 824 (4th 
ed. 1992); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-701 (McKinney 1989). 
 23. See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976). 
 24. See, e.g., R.R. v. M.H. 689 N.E.2d 790 (Mass. 1998). 
 25. See id. 
 26. See Watts v. Watts, 405 N.W.2d 303, 311 (Wis. 1997). 
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students to think about the principles that determine the legal effect of 
legislative decisions in doubtful cases, and the answers to such questions adjust 
the boundary line between public and private order.  I wish that I could spend 
more time on the subject than I usually do. 
7. Part Performance and the Statute of Frauds 
Sometimes the courts extend legislation creatively to defeat private 
ordering, as in the “surrogate-motherhood” cases, but sometimes they protect 
private ordering by defying the legislature and creating law of their own.  I 
have already alluded to the harsh treatment that the statute of limitations 
receives at the hands of the common-law courts.  I will conclude this part of 
the discussion by mentioning the role that “equity” sometimes plays in the 
enforcement of statutory law.  I have a familiar example in mind. 
The old Statute of Frauds provides that contracts for the sale or transfer of 
an interest in land must be in writing.  But human beings do not always comply 
with statutory standards, and they sometimes make contracts for the sale or 
transfer of interests in land without putting pen to paper.  In some of these 
cases the parties may actually perform the contract in part before dissolving 
into disputation, and in such cases the party seeking to enforce the contract 
may seek the aid of the courts of equity.  At an early date the courts of equity 
demonstrated their willingness to ignore the Statute of Frauds and to enforce 
partially performed oral contracts for the sale or transfer of interests in land, if 
the performance was substantial and compelling; and this traditional practice 
ripened into the part-performance rule that is recognized in most American 
jurisdictions today.27 
Now the question is this: why do modern judges think that they are free to 
ignore the Statute of Frauds in cases such as these?  Here we are confronted 
with what can only be described as a judicially created exception to an 
otherwise unqualified statutory command.  What role must judges play in the 
interpretation and enforcement of statutory law?  The part-performance rule 
originated at a time when the concept of the separation of powers was far less 
important than it is today.  Whatever role the Lord Chancellor may have 
played in British government in the eighteenth century, is it appropriate for 
American judges to play the same role as they interpret and enforce legislation 
in the twenty-first century?  Furthermore, we are dealing here with a question 
of public order versus private order.  The legislature has prescribed certain 
public standards to govern transactions involving interests in land, but here the 
parties have seen fit to make an agreement that ignores them.  Which order 
should prevail?  And how, in general, should the courts adjust the conflict 
between the one order and the other?  (Of course, it is possible to discuss the 
 
 27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 129 (1981). 
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old part-performance exception without getting into questions such as these, 
but why let the matter pass?) 
II 
SOME PEDAGOGICAL SUGGESTIONS 
I have identified two problems—the problem of overcoming the common-
law bias that is built into our traditional teaching methods and materials, and 
the problem of discussing intelligibly the mysterious legal events that occur at 
the intersection of legislation and common law.  I must now propose some 
solutions.  Here are a few ideas. 
A. Raising Legislative Consciousness 
It is possible to counteract the common-law bias simply by talking more 
openly and more emphatically about legislative issues as they come up in the 
normal course of pedagogical events.  At the first sighting of a significant 
piece of legislation in the first-year course, the Langdellian ball should 
temporarily stop rolling, and the teacher should devote substantial class time to 
the following questions: (a) Where does legislation come from?  (b) What 
forces, political and otherwise, bear upon the legislative process?  (c) What are 
the legal differences, if any, between a statutory text and a common-law rule?  
(d) What is a legislative “code,” and how does one deal with such a “code”?  
(e) What are administrative “rules”?  (f) What is the appropriate judicial role in 
the interpretation and enforcement of legislation?  (g) What are the dominant 
modern theories of legislative interpretation?  (h) What is the legal significance 
of the enacted legislative text?  (i) What is the significance of the underlying 
legislative intention?  (j) What factors, other than text or intention, should 
affect the interpretation of legislation?  (k) How, in general, do legislation and 
the interpretation of legislation affect the law of contracts? 
I recognize that our students will be exposed to some of these questions in 
some of their other first-year courses, and, in any event, I do not believe that 
we should convert the contracts course into a course on legislation.  But surely 
we need to administer a mild corrective.  For the sake of balance, and for the 
sake of fidelity to the real world, we should talk a little less about the well-
beloved, lawyer-centered process of the common law and a little more about (i) 
the politician-centered legislative process and (ii) the baffling, poorly 
articulated process of judicial interpretation by which courts convert unmoving 
legislative texts, suppositions concerning legislative will, and other amorphous 
concerns into effective, legislatively-based law. 
Furthermore, I would adjust our pedagogical methods at least occasionally.  
Every now and then I would begin a class discussion, not with a judicial 
decision or an abstract legal proposition, but with a specific statute or 
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administrative rule.  I would ask, where did this piece of legislation come 
from?  Who made it?  Why did they make it?  What is its legal meaning?  How 
do we know its legal meaning?  I would then turn, not to a judicial decision, 
but to a series of hypothetical problems involving contractual transactions, and 
I would ask, how does this legislation apply to these facts?  Finally, after 
developing a sense of the legislation and its possible applications, I would 
consider the case law and the phenomenon of judicial interpretation.  The 
following questions would be relevant to that undertaking.  How do the courts 
deal with this legislation?  What theories of interpretation do they adopt?  Are 
their judgments good ones or bad ones, given the role that courts must play in 
the interpretation and enforcement of legislation?  And, finally, does this piece 
of legislation, as interpreted, damage or improve the law? 
B. Supplementing the Langdellian Themes 
I have great affection for the old verities, and I would not abandon them.  
The law of contracts is indeed a system of practical reasoning (at least some of 
the time), it does indeed emerge from judicial action (at least some of the 
time), it does indeed support a system of private ordering (at least some of the 
time), and it does indeed contribute to the health of civil society (at least some 
of the time).  But we need to supplement these grand themes with others that 
recognize the role of legislation in the law of contracts, and we need to pursue 
these other themes just as doggedly as we pursue the traditional ones.  In other 
words, after taking the first step—after resolving to talk more openly and more 
frequently about legislative issues—we must attempt to bring order to the 
subject by showing how legislative issues link together and how they relate to 
the larger story. 
Here are two supplementary themes that I would attempt to develop in the 
first-year course.  First, the law of contracts is a mixed system that regulates 
consensual transactions according to standards that are created both by private 
choices and by public choices.  Second, the substantive law of contracts 
originates sometimes in the courts and sometimes in the legislative chamber, 
and it sometimes emerges from the confluence of legislation and judge-made 
law.  I would work hardest on the last point.  The hybrid legal events that occur 
at the intersection of legislation and common law are both intellectually 
challenging and practically important.  I would not be able to tell my students 
much about them (because I do not know much about them), but I could 
highlight the main propositions.  I would note that in the law of contracts, 
legislation can sometimes produce legal effects that the legislation itself does 
not describe.  For example, legislation can implicitly invalidate agreements 
that might otherwise be valid and enforceable, as in the case of “surrogate-
motherhood”28 contracts or contracts founded on pre-existing statutory duties; 
 
 28. See supra text accompanying notes 24-25. 
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and legislation can sometimes implicitly undermine quasi-contractual rights, as 
in the case of neglectful subcontractors under the mechanics’ lien statutes.29  I 
would tell my students that, conversely, legislation can sometimes implicitly 
create or enhance contract rights, as in the case of third-party rights under 
certain government contracts. 
And what is true of legislation is also roughly true of the common law.  If 
legislation can trump the common law, common law can influence both the 
interpretation and the enforcement of legislation.  Cases involving covenants-
not-to-compete provide an especially good illustration of this point.30  Cases 
involving the revival of time-barred debts31 and the “part-performance” 
exception to the Statute of Frauds32 provide both subtle and flagrant examples 
of the same thing. 
These hybrid phenomena present a larger question that is probably 
unanswerable but nonetheless worth posing: what principles, if any, are at 
work within this field?  The standard theories of statutory interpretation, 
intentionalism and textualism, provide inadequate answers in most instances.  
My own pet theory is that judges fall back on some very simple ideas when 
they are asked to integrate legislation with common law.  They understand, on 
their better days, that (a) like cases should be treated alike, (b) the legal system 
should provide an adequate remedy for every legal wrong, and (c) substantial 
justice should generally triumph over form.  Ideas such as these are not 
peculiar to the law of contracts, of course, but they influence the law of 
contracts profoundly; and they can be most influential, as one might expect, in 
the cases that fall between the cracks of settled law, including the cases that 
inhabit the space between common law and legislation.  I would add this last 
idea to the list of grand themes to which our first-year students should be 
exposed. 
C. Considering a Modest Reorganization 
The traditional course in contract law is organized topically according to a 
standard analysis of the substantive law.  The topics are much the same as 
those set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.  They involve discrete 
substantive issues.  I love this tradition as much as anyone.  It makes almost 
perfect sense, and the authors of the leading casebooks do right to adhere to it 
closely.  I would suggest, however, that methodological issues are sometimes 
important even in courses devoted to substantive law, and it is possible to 
organize useful discussions around them.  With this idea in mind, I would 
make the following suggestion. 
 
 29. See supra text accompanying note 20. 
 30. See supra text accompanying notes 10-11. 
 31. See supra text accompanying note 22. 
 32. See supra text accompanying notes 27. 
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To deal adequately with the general question of the role of legislation in 
the law of contracts, it may be desirable or perhaps even necessary to devote 
one small segment of the course to that question alone.  To be sure, legislative 
issues come up repeatedly during the traditional course, as the discussion 
proceeds normally from one substantive issue to another, and it is possible to 
discuss legislative issues effectively in that context.  But I have found that the 
substantive agenda inevitably limits and skews the discussion, and thus I have 
concluded that at some point it may make sense to put the substantive agenda 
to one side.  Collect some interesting cases involving legislative issues.  (It 
does not really matter what they are.)  Arrange the cases so that they illustrate 
the various ways in which legislation can affect, or fail to affect, the law of 
contracts.  Block out two or three class hours somewhere around the middle of 
the course, and start a discussion. 
Of course, there will be a natural reluctance to depart from the normal 
substantive sequence for the sake of what can only be described as a diversion 
into the mists of jurisprudence.  Yet the traditionalists and the skeptics should 
remind themselves of the point I made in the beginning.  The traditional course 
in contract law is already a course in jurisprudence, the jurisprudence of the 
common law.  Our students already learn everything they need to know about 
common law methodology in the law of contracts.  The case method itself 
guarantees this result.  What they miss is a systematic exposure to legislative 
sources and methods, and a short segment devoted to that subject may well 
supply the deficiency. 
 
